Abstract. In this paper we introduce a notion of fault-tolerance distance between labeled transition systems. Intuitively, this notion of distance measures the degree of fault-tolerance exhibited by a candidate system. In practice, there are different kinds of fault-tolerance, here we restrict ourselves to the analysis of masking fault-tolerance because it is often a highly desirable goal for critical systems. Roughly speaking, a system is masking fault-tolerant when it is able to completely mask the faults, not allowing these faults to have any observable consequences for the users. We capture masking fault-tolerance via a simulation relation, which is accompanied by a corresponding game characterization. We enrich the resulting games with quantitative objectives to define the notion of masking fault-tolerance distance. Furthermore, we investigate the basic properties of this notion of masking distance, and we prove that it is a directed pseudo metric. We have implemented our approach in a prototype tool that automatically compute the masking distance between a nominal system and a fault-tolerant version of it. We have used this tool to measure the masking tolerance of multiple instances of several case studies.
Introduction
Fault-tolerance allows for the construction of systems that are able to overcome the occurrence of faults during their execution. Examples of fault-tolerant systems can be found everywhere: communication protocols, hardware circuits, avionic systems, cryptographic currencies, etc. So, the increasing relevance of critical software in everyday life has led to a renewed interest in the automatic verification of fault-tolerant properties. However, one of the main difficulties when reasoning about these kinds of properties is given by their quantitative nature, which is true even for non-probabilistic systems. A simple example is given by the introduction of redundancy in critical systems. This is one by far of the main techniques used to achieve fault-tolerance. It is well-known that adding more redundancy to a system increases the system reliability. Most importantly, measuring this increment is a central issue when evaluating different fault-tolerant protocols or implementations. On the other hand, the formal characterization of fault-tolerant properties could be an involving task, usually these properties are encoded using ad-hoc mechanisms as part of a general design.
The usual flow for the design and verification of fault-tolerant systems consists in defining a nominal model (i.e., the "fault-free" or "ideal" program) and afterwards extending it with faulty behaviors that deviate from the normal behavior prescribed by the nominal model. This extended model represents the way in which the system operates under the occurrence of faults. There are different ways of extending the nominal model, the typical approach is fault injection [18, 19] , that is, the automatic introduction of faults into the model. An important property that any extended model has to satisfy is the preservation of the normal behavior under the absence of faults. In [10] , we proposed an alternative formal approach for dealing with the analysis of fault-tolerance. This approach allows for a fully automated analysis and appropriately distinguishes faulty behaviors from normal ones. Moreover, this framework is amenable to fault-injection. In that work, three notions of simulation relations are defined to characterize masking, nonmasking, and failsafe fault-tolerance, as originally defined in [13] .
During the last decade, significant progress has been made towards defining suitable metrics or distances for diverse types of quantitative models including real-time systems [17] , probabilistic models [11] , and metrics for linear and branching systems [5, 7, 16, 21, 27] . Some authors have already pointed out that these metrics can be useful to reason about the robustness of a system, a notion related to fault-tolerance. Particularly, in [5] the traditional notion of simulation relation is generalized and three different simulation distances between systems are introduced, namely correctness, coverage, and robustness. These are defined using quantitative games with discounted-sum and mean-payoff objectives.
In this paper we introduce a notion of fault-tolerance distance between labelled transition systems. Intuitively, this distance measures the degree of faulttolerance exhibited by a candidate system. As it was mentioned above, there exist different levels of fault-tolerance, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of masking fault-tolerance because it is often thought of as the most benign kind of fault-tolerance and it is a highly desirable property for critical systems. Roughly speaking, a system is masking fault-tolerant when it is able to completely mask the faults, not allowing these faults to have any observable consequences for the users. Formally, the system must preserve both the safety and liveness properties of the nominal model [13] . In contrast to the robustness distance defined in [5] , which measures how many unexpected errors are tolerated by the implementation, we consider a specific collection of faults given in the implementation and measure how many faults are tolerated by the implementation in such a way that they can be masked by the states. We also require that the normal behavior of the specification has to be preserved by the implementation when no faults are present. In this case, we have a bisimulation between the specification and the non-faulty behavior of the implementation. Otherwise, the distance is 1. Thus, we effectively distinguish between the nominal model and its fault-tolerant version and the set of faults taken into account. In Section 5, we compare in more details the robustness distance and our notion of fault-tolerance distance.
In order to measure the degree of masking fault-tolerance of a given system, we start characterizing masking fault-tolerance via simulation relations between two systems as defined in [10] . The first one acting as a specification of the intended behavior (i.e., nominal model) and the second one as the fault-tolerant implementation (i.e., the extended model with faulty behavior). The existence of a masking relation implies that the implementation masks the faults. Afterwards, we introduce a game characterization of masking simulation and we enrich the resulting games with quantitative objectives to define the notion of masking fault-tolerance distance, where the possible values of the game belong to the interval [0, 1]. The fault-tolerant implementation is masking fault-tolerant if the value of the game is 0. Furthermore, the bigger the number, the farther the masking distance between the fault-tolerant implementation and the specification. Accordingly, a bigger distance remarkably decreases fault-tolerance. In addition, we prove that it is a directed pseudo metric. Specifically, we prove that our definition of masking distance satisfies two basic properties of any distance, reflexivity and the triangle inequality.
Finally, we have implemented our approach in a tool that takes a nominal model and its fault-tolerant implementation and automatically compute the masking distance among them. We have used this tool to measure the masking tolerance of multiple instances of several case studies such as a redundant cell memory, the bounded retransmission protocol, and the byzantine generals introduced by Lamport et al. [20] .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce preliminaries notions used throughout this paper. We present in Section 3 the formal definition of masking distance build on quantitative simulation games and we also prove its basic properties. We describe in Section 4 the experimental evaluation on some well-known case studies. In Section 5 we discuss the related work. Finally, we discuss in Section 6 some conclusions and directions for further work.
Preliminaries
Let us introduce some basic definitions and results on game theory that will be necessary across the paper, the interested reader is referred to [1] .
A Transition System (TS) is a tuple A = S, Σ, E, s 0 , where S is a finite set of states, Σ is a finite alphabet, E ⊆ S ×Σ ×S is a set of labelled transitions, and s 0 is the initial state. In the following we use s e − → s ′ ∈ E as a syntactic sugar for (s, e, s ′ ) ∈ E. Let |S| and |E| denote the number of states and edges, respectively. We define post(s) = {s ′ ∈ S | s e − → s ′ ∈ E} as the set of successors of s. Similarly, pre(s ′ ) = {s ∈ S | s e − → s ′ ∈ E} as the set of predecessors of s ′ . Moreover, post * (s) denotes the states which are reachable from s. Without loss of generality, we require that every state s has a successor, i.e., ∀s ∈ S : post(s) = ∅. A run in a transition system A is an infinite path ρ = ρ 0 σ 0 ρ 1 σ 1 ρ 2 σ 2 · · · ∈ (S · Σ) w where ρ 0 = s 0 and for all i, ρ i σi − → ρ i+1 ∈ E. From now on, given a tuple (x 0 , . . . , x n ), we denote by pr i ((x 0 , . . . , x n )) its i-th projection.
A game graph G is a tuple G = S, S 1 , S 2 , Σ, E, s 0 where S, Σ, E and s 0 are as in transition systems and (S 1 , S 2 ) is a partition of S. The choice of the next state is made by Player 1 (Player 2) when the current state is in S 1 (respectively, S 2 ). A weighted game graph is a game graph along with a weight function v G from E to Q. A run in the game graph G is called a play. The set of all plays is denoted by Ω.
Given a game graph G, a strategy for Player 1 is a function π : (S · Σ)
A strategy for Player 2 is defined in a similar way. The set of all strategies for Player p is denoted by Π p . A strategy for player p is said to be memoryless (or positional) if it can be defined by a mapping f : S p → E such that for all s ∈ S p we have that s pr 0 (f (s)) − −−−−− → pr 1 (f (s)) ∈ E, that is, these strategies do not need memory of the past history. Furthermore, a play ρ 0 σ 0 ρ 1 σ 1 ρ 2 σ 2 . . . conforms to a player p strategy π if ∀i ≥ 0 :
The outcome of a Player 1 strategy π 1 and a Player 2 strategy π 2 is the unique play, named out(π 1 , π 2 ), that conforms to both π 1 and π 2 .
A game is made of a game graph and a boolean or quantitative objective. A boolean objective is a function Φ : Ω → {0, 1} and the goal of Player 1 in a game with objective Φ is to select a strategy so that the outcome maps to 1, independently what Player 2 does. On the contrary, the goal of Player 2 is to ensure that the outcome maps to 0. Given a boolean objective Φ, a play ρ is winning for Player 1 (resp. Player 2) if Φ(ρ) = 1 (resp. Φ(ρ) = 0). A strategy π is a winning strategy for Player p if every play conforming to π is winning for Player p. We say that a game with boolean objective is determined is some player has a winning strategy, and we say that it is memoryless determined if that winning strategy is memoryless. Reachability games are those games whose objective functions are defined as Φ(ρ 0 σ 0 ρ 1 σ 1 ρ 2 σ 2 . . . ) = (∃i : ρ i ∈ V ) for some set V ⊆ S, a standard result is that reachability games are memoryless determined.
A quantitative objective is given by a payoff function f : Ω → R and the goal of Player 1 is to maximize the value f of the play, whereas the goal of Player 2 is to minimize it. For a quantitative objective f , the value of the game for a Player 1 strategy π 1 , denoted by v 1 (π 1 ), is defined as the infimum over all the values resulting from Player 2 strategies, i.e., v 1 (π 1 ) = inf π2∈Π2 f (out(π 1 , π 2 )). The value of the game for Player 1 is defined as the supremum of the values of all Player 1 strategies, i.e., sup π1∈Π1 v 1 (π 1 ). Analogously, the value of the game for a Player 2 strategy π 2 and the value of the game for Player 2 are defined as v 2 (π 2 ) = sup π1∈Π1 f (out(π 1 , π 2 )) and inf π2∈Π2 v 2 (π 2 ), respectively. We say that a game is determined if both values are equal, that is: sup π1∈Π1 v 1 (π 1 ) = inf π2∈Π2 v 2 (π 2 ). In this case we denote by val(G) the value of game G. The following result from [22] characterizes a large set of determined games. Theorem 1. Any game with a quantitative function f that is bounded and Borel measurable is determined.
Masking Distance
We start by defining masking simulation. In [10] , we have defined a state-based simulation for masking fault-tolerance, here we recast this definition using labelled transition systems. First, let us introduce some concepts needed for defining masking fault-tolerance. For any vocabulary Σ, and set of labels F = {F 0 , . . . , F n } not belonging to Σ, we consider Σ F = Σ ∪ F , where F ∩ Σ = ∅. Intuitively, the elements of F indicate the occurrence of a fault in a faulty implementation. Furthermore, sometimes it will be useful to consider the set Σ i = {e i | e ∈ Σ}, containing the elements of Σ indexed with superscript i. Moreover, for any vocabulary Σ we consider Σ M = Σ ∪ {M }, where M / ∈ Σ, intuitively, this label is used to identify masking transitions.
Given a transition system A = S, Σ, E, s 0 over a vocabulary Σ, we denote
3.1 Strong Masking Simulation Definition 1. Given two transition systems A = S, Σ M , E, s 0 and
(B) for all s ∈ S, s ′ ∈ S ′ with s M s ′ then for each e ∈ Σ the following holds:
We say that state s ′ is masking fault-tolerant for s when s M s ′ . Intuitively, the intention in the definition is that, starting in s ′ , faults can be masked in such a way that the behavior exhibited is the same as that observed when starting from s and executing transitions without faults. In other words, a masking relation ensures that every faulty behavior in the implementation can be simulated by the specification. Let us explain in more detail the above definition. First, note that conditions A, B.1, and B.2 imply that we have a bisimulation when A and A ′ do not exhibit faulty behavior. Particularly, condition B.1 says that the normal execution of A can be masked by an execution of A ′ . On the other hand, condition B.2 says that the implementation does not add normal (non-faulty) behavior. Finally, condition B.3 states that every outgoing faulty transition (F ) from s ′ must be matched to an outgoing masking transition (M ) from s. Definition 2. Given two transition systems A = S, Σ, E, s 0 and
If A ≺ Mask A ′ we say that A ′ is a strong masking fault-tolerant implementation of A.
Weak Masking Simulation
For analysing nontrivial systems, a weak version of masking simulation relation is needed, it could abstract away from internal transitions, which are inherent in any fault-tolerant system.
The main idea is that weak masking simulation abstracts away from internal behaviour of the systems, which is modelled by a special action τ . We define a set of weak transition relations ⇒⊆ S × (Σ ∪ {τ } ∪ {M } ∪ F ) × S, also denoted as E W , which is formally defined as follow:
The symbol • stands for composition of binary relations and (
* is the reflexive and transitive closure of the binary relation
′ ∈ E W means that from s there is a sequence of zero or more transitions labelled by τ , followed by one transition labelled by e, followed again by zero or more transitions labelled by τ such that we reach the state s ′ . By writing s τ = ⇒ s ′ we state that we can go from s to s ′ via zero or more τ transitions labelled by τ . In particular, for every state s we have s τ = ⇒ s.
Definition 3. Given two transition systems
(where Σ M and Σ F possible contains the distinguished silent action τ ), we say that A ′ is weak masking fault-tolerant with respect to A if there exists a relation
(B) for all s ∈ S, s ′ ∈ S ′ with s M s ′ then for each e ∈ Σ ∪ {τ } the following holds:
Theorem 2. Given two transition systems
is a weak masking simulation iff:
The proof of this theorem is straightforward following the same ideas of Milner in [24] . We remark that we do not include the proofs for each theorem and lemma stated in this section due to space restriction, the interesting readers can access them in [4] .
A natural way to check weak bisimilarity is to saturate [12, 24] the transition system and then check strong bisimilarity on the saturated transition system. Following the same idea, we can compute weak masking simulation by reducing it to strong masking simulation. Notice that e = ⇒ can be alternatively defined by:
Note that weak masking simulation on e − → coincides with strong masking simulation on e = ⇒, thus we can check weak masking simulation by applying the algorithms for strong masking simulation to the saturated transition system.
Definition 4. Given two transition systems
If A Mask A ′ we say that A ′ is a weak masking fault-tolerant implementation of A.
Running example. Let us consider a memory cell that stores a bit of information and supports reading and writing operations, presented in a state-based form in [10] . A state in this system maintains the current value of the memory cell (m = i, for i = 0, 1), writing allows one to change this value, and reading returns the stored value. Obviously, in this system the result of a reading depends on the value stored in the cell. Thus, a property that one might associate with this model is that the value read from the cell coincides with that of the last writing performed in the system.
A potential fault in this scenario occurs when a cell unexpectedly loses its charge, and its stored value turns into another one (e.g., it changes from 1 to 0 due to charge loss). A typical technique to deal with this situation is redundancy: use three memory bits instead of one. Writing operations are performed simultaneously on the three bits. Reading, on the other hand, returns the value that is repeated at least twice in the memory bits; this is known as voting.
We take the following approach to model this system. We have labels W 0 , W 1 , R 0 , and R 1 for representing writing and reading operations. Specifically, W 0 (resp. W 1 ): writes a zero (resp. one) in the memory. R 0 (resp. R 1 ): reads a zero (resp. one) from the memory. Figure 1 depictes four transition systems. The leftmost one represents the nominal system for this example (denoted as A). The second one from the left characterizes the nominal transition system augmented with masking transitions, i.e., A M . The third and fourth ones from the left to the right are fault-tolerant implementations of A, named A ′ and A ′′ , respectively. Note that A ′ contains one fault, while A ′′ considers two faults. Both implementations use triple redundancy; intuitively, state t 0 contains the three bits with value zero and t 1 contains the three bits with value one. Moreover, state t 2 is reached when one of the bits was flipped (either 001, 010 or 100). In A ′′ , state t 3 is reached when two of three bits were flipped (either 011 or 101 or 110) starting from state t 0 . It is simple to see that there exists a relation of masking fault-tolerance between s 0
Fig. 1. Transition systems for the memory cell.
A M and A ′ , as it is witnessed by the relation
It is a routine to check that M satisfies the conditions of Definition 1. On the other hand, there does not exists a masking relation between A M and A ′′ because state t 3 must be related to state s 0 in any masking relation. This state can only be reached by executing faults, which are necessarily masked with M-transitions. However, note that, in state t 3 , we can read a 1 (transition t 3
R1
− − → t 3 ) whereas, in state s 0 , we can only read a 0.
Masking Simulation Game
Let us now define a masking simulation game for two transition systems (the specification of the nominal system and its fault-tolerant implementation) capturing masking fault-tolerance. We first define the masking game graph where we have two players named by convenience the refuter (R) and the verifier (V ).
Definition 5. Given two transition systems
G for two players as follows: 
and E G is the minimal set satisfying: The intuition of this game is as follows. The refuter chooses transitions of either the specification or the implementation to play, and the verifier tries to match her choice, this is similar to the bisimulation game [26] . However, when the refuter chooses a fault, the verifier must match it with a masking transition (M ), the intuitive reading of this is that the fault-tolerant implementation masked the fault in such a way that the occurrence of this fault cannot be noticed from the users' side. R wins if the game reaches the error state, i.e., s err . On the other hand, V wins when that state is not reached during the game (i.e., this is basically a reachability game [25] ). We say Ver(v) (resp. Ref(v)) if v is a verifier's node (resp. refuter's node v).
A weak masking game graph is defined in the same way as strong masking game graph in Def. 5, with the exception that Σ M and Σ F contains the distinguished silent action τ . Moreover, the set of labelled transitions (denoted as E G W ) is now defined using the weak transition relations (i.e., E W and E ′ W ) from the given transition systems. − − → (s 0 , R 2 1 , t 3 , V ) selected by the Refuter which reads a 1 at state t 3 on the faulttolerant implementation. This is because the Verifier can only read a 0 at state s 0 . Then, the s err is reached and the Refuter wins.
Theorem 3. Given transition systems
, we state that A ≺ Mask A ′ iff the verifier has a winning strategy for the strong masking game graph
Similarly, we can state the same for the weak masking game graph by Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. Given transition systems
iff the verifier has a winning strategy for the weak masking game graph G A M ,A ′ .
Using the standard properties of reachability games we get the following property.
Theorem 5. For any A and A ′ , the masking game graph G A M ,A ′ is determined. Furthermore, the strong (weak) masking game graph can be determined in time The set of winning states for the Refuter can be defined in a standard way from the error state [25] . Let us adapt these ideas to our setting, the sets U j i are defined as follows:
indicates that at most after i − 1 faults we will reach the error state. The following lemma is straightforwardly proven using standard techniques of reachability games [8] .
Lemma 1. The Refuter has a winning strategy iff s init ∈ U k , for some k.
Quantitative Masking
In this section, we extend the strong masking simulation game introduced above with quantitative objectives to define the notion of masking fault-tolerance dis-tance. Note that we use the attribute "quantitative" in a non-probabilistic sense.
Definition 6. Given transition systems A = S, Σ, E, s 0 and
where χ F is the characteristic function over the set F , which returns 1 if e ∈ F and 0 otherwise. Similarly, for χ serr over the singleton set {s err }. Note that the cost function returns a pair of numbers instead of a single number. It is direct to codify this pair into a number, but we do not do it here for the sake of clarity. We remark that a quantitative weak masking game graph is defined in the same way as a quantitative strong game graph defined above but using the weak masking game graph. Given a quantitative strong masking game graph with the weight function v G and a play ρ = ρ 0 σ 0 ρ 1 σ 1 ρ 2 , . . ., for all i ≥ 0, let
We define the masking payoff function as follow:
, which is proportional to the inverse of the number of masking movements made by the verifier. To see this, note that the numerator of pr 1 (vn) 1+ n i=0 pr 0 (vi) will be 1 when we reach the error state, that is, in those paths not reaching the error state this formula returns 0. Furthermore, if the error state is reached, then the denominator will count the faulty transitions taken until the error state. All of them, excepting maybe the last one, were matched by a masking step, and the last masking step leads to an error. That is, the transitions that have a value 1 are those that masks relevant faults (i.e., faults that lead to the error state). The others are mapped to 0. Then, the refuter wants to maximize the value of any run, that is, she will try to execute faults leading to the state s err . In contrast, the verifier wants to avoid s err and then she will try to mask faults with actions that take her away from the error state. More precisely, the value of the quantitative masking game for the refuter is defined as val R (Q A M ,A ′ ) = sup πR∈ΠR inf πV ∈ΠV f mask (out(π R , π V )). Analogously, the value of the game for the verifier is defined as val V (Q A M ,A ′ ) = inf πV ∈ΠV sup πR∈ΠR f mask (out(π R , π V )). Then, we define the value of the quantitative strong masking game, denoted by val(Q A M ,A ′ ), as the value of the game either for the refuter or the verifier, i.e., val(
. This can be done because quantitative strong masking games are determined as we prove below in Theorem 6. Definition 7. Given transition systems A and A ′ , the masking distance between A and A ′ , denoted by δ mask (A, A ′ ) is defined as:
We would like to remark that the masking distance is defined in the same way for the quantitative weak masking game graph. Roughly speaking, we are interesting on measuring the number of faults that can be masked. The value of the game is essentially determined by the faulty and masking labels on the game graph and how the players can find a strategy to lead or avoid the state s err , independently if there are or not silent actions.
Let us now state some basic properties of this kind of games. First, we state that quantitative strong masking games are determined as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6. For any quantitative strong masking game Q A M ,A ′ with payoff function f mask we have that:
The following result allows us to calculate the value of this kind of games:
Theorem 7. Given a quantitative strong masking game Q A M ,A ′ we have that:
where the sets U 's is defined as in Subsection 3.3 over the qualitative part of the game.
Note that the sets U j i can be calculated using a bottom-up breadth-first search from the error state. Thus, the strategies for the refuter and the verifier can be defined using these sets, without taking into account the history of the play. That is, we have the following theorems: Theorem 8. Players R and V have memoryless winning strategies for Q A M ,A ′ .
Theorem 9. The quantitative strong (weak) masking game can be determined in time O(|S
Now, we present some basic properties of the masking distance.
Theorem 10. For any transition systems A and A
This follows from Theorem 7. That is, the masking distance between two systems is 0 if and only if there is a masking simulation between them. Noting that A ≺ Mask A (the same for A Mask A) for any transition system A, we obtain that δ mask (A, A) = 0 by Theorem 10, i.e., the reflexivity of δ mask . For instance, for our running example, the masking distance is 1/3 with a redundancy of 3 bits and considering two faults. This means that only one fault can be masked by this implementation. We can prove a version of the triangle inequality for our notion of distance.
Theorem 11. For every transition systems
These two properties imply that masking distance is a directed semi-metric [6, 9] . Moreover, it is interesting to note that the triangle inequality property has practical applications. When developing critical software is quite common to develop a first version of the software taking into account some possible anticipated faults. Later, more plausible faults could be observed after testing and execution of the system. Consequently, the system is modified with additional fault-tolerant capabilities to be able to overcome them. Theorem 11 tells us that incrementally measuring the masking distance between these different versions of the software provides an upper bound to the actual distance between the nominal system and its last fault-tolerant version. That is, if the sum of the distances obtained between the different versions is a small number, then we can ensure that the final system will exhibit an acceptable masking tolerance to faults w.r.t. the nominal system.
Experimental Evaluation

Details of the implementation
The approach described in this paper have been implemented in a tool called MaskD: Masking Distance Tool. This is written in Java and is free software. The tool MaskD takes as input a nominal model and its fault-tolerant implementation, and produces as output the masking distance among them. The input models are specified using a guarded command language. More precisely, programs are described in a guarded command style. A guarded command is composed of a boolean condition over the actual state of the system and an assignment, written as Guard → Command. These syntactical constructions are called actions, and a program consists of a collection of actions. The language also allows user to label an action as internal. Moreover, some actions are used to represent faults. The tool has an option to print the error trace. Another option is to allow the user to start a simulation from the initial state of the game graph and enables the user to interactively choose every state, step by step. The tool also allows for deadlock to be considered an error state in the game.
Experimental results
We report on Table 2 the results of the masking distance for multiple instances of several case studies. These are: a redundant cell memory, the bounded retransmission protocol, and a variation of the dining philosopher problem. In more details, we have adopted the odd/even philosophers model, where there are n − 1 even philosophers that pick the right fork first, and 1 odd philosopher that picks the left fork first. In this case, we consider that there is a fault whenever an even philosopher behaves as an odd one. We have evaluated this problem on four instances with 2, 3, 4, and 5 philosophers, respectively. It is worth noting that for this case study, we consider deadlock as an error state. We have also evaluated our framework with the Bounded Retransmission Protocol (BRP) [14] where silent actions are involved. We carried out experiments with three sizes of chunks (1, 3, and 5) and varying the retransmission limits with 1, 3, 5, and 7. Note that BRP (1) on Table 2 denotes that the number of chunks is equal to 1. Similarly, for BRP (3) and BRP (5). We observe that the masking distance values are not affected by the number of chunks to be sent on the protocol. This is expected due to the masking distance depend on the redundancy added to mask the faults, which is in this case the number of retransmissions.
We have run our experiments on a MacBook Air with Processor 1.3 GHz Intel Core i5 and a memory of 4 Gb. The tool and case studies for reproducing the results are available at https://github.com/lputruele/MaskD.
Related Work
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the quantitative generalizations of the boolean notion of correctness and the corresponding quantitative verification questions [3, 5, 15, 16] . The framework described in [5] is the closest related work to our approach. The authors generalize the traditional notion of simulation relation to three different versions of simulation distance: correctness, coverage, and robustness. These are defined using quantitative games with discounted-sum and mean-payoff objectives, two well-known cost functions. Similarly to that work, we also consider distances between purely discrete (non-probabilistic, untimed) systems. Correctness and coverage distances are concerned with the nominal part of the systems, and so faults play no role on them. On the other hand, robustness distance measures how many unexpected errors can be performed by the implementation in such a way that the resulting behavior is tolerated by the specification. So, it can be used to analyze the resilience of the implementation. Note that, robustness distance can only be applied to correct implementations, that is, implementations that preserve the behavior of the specification but perhaps do not cover all its behavior. As noted in [5] , bisimilarity sometimes implies a distance of 1. In this sense a greater grade of robustness (as defined in [5] ) is achieved by pruning critical points from the specification. Furthermore, the errors considered in that work are transitions mimicking the original ones but with different labels. In contrast to this, in our approach we consider that faults are injected into the fault-tolerant implementation, where their behaviors are not restricted by the nominal system. This follows the idea of model extension in fault-tolerance where faulty behavior is added to the nominal system. Further, note that when no faults are present, the masking distance between the specification and the implementation is 0 when there are bisimilar, and it is 1 otherwise. It is useful to note that robustness distance is not reflexive. We believe that all these definitions of distance between systems capture different notions useful for software development, and they can be used together, in a complementary way, to obtain an in-depth evaluation of fault-tolerant implementations.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a notion of masking fault-tolerance distance between systems built on a characterization of masking tolerance via simulation relations and a corresponding game representation with quantitative objectives. Our framework is well-suited to support engineers for the analysis and design of fault-tolerant systems. More precisely, we have defined a computable masking distance function such that an engineer can measure the masking tolerance of a given fault-tolerant implementation, i.e., the number of faults that can be masked. Thereby, the engineer can measure and compare the masking faulttolerance distance of alternative fault-tolerant implementations, and select one that fits best to her preferences.
There are many directions for future work. We have only defined a notion of fault-tolerance distance for masking fault-tolerance, similar notions of distance can be defined for other levels of fault-tolerance like failsafe and non-masking, we leave this as a further work.
A Definitions
Definition 8. Given two transition systems A = S, Σ M , E W , s 0 and
(where Σ M and Σ F possible contains the distinguished silent action τ ), we define the weak masking game graph
for two players as follows:
and E G W is the minimal set satisfying: 
B Proofs of Properties
Proof of Lemma 1. The Refuter has a winning strategy iff s init ∈ U k , for some k.
Proof. ⇒) Suppose that the Refuter has a winning strategy namely π and that s init / ∈ U k i for any i and k. This means that π(s init ) returns a node v such that v / ∈ U k i (for any i and k) (by definition of U k i ), and from there the Verifier can select a node v ′ / ∈ U k i (for any i and k), and again this can be repeated forever. Therefore, the play never reaches s err , which means that the Verifier wins and that leads to a contradiction. ⇐) Consider s init ∈ U k for some k, where we have that s init ∈ U k i for some i by definition. Any winning strategy for the refuter is simple, for any v ∈ U
which exists by definition. Since s init ∈ U k and the Refuter has to play, then the play will reach in j − 1 steps the set U 1 , i.e., the s err state. ⋄ Proof of Theorem 3. Given transition systems A = S, Σ, E, s 0 and 
Proof. In order to prove that the masking payoff function f mask is determined we have to prove that it is bounded and Borel measurable (Martin's theorem [22] ). First, f mask is bounded by definition. Second, to see that f mask is Borel measurable note that f mask (Ω) ⊆ [0, 1], and then it is sufficient to prove that, for every rational x, f 
Proof. First, note that any play avoiding state s err has value 0. By definition of the game, each transition performed by the Refuter must be followed by a transition selected by the Verifier. These transitions (the matches performed by the Verifier) have cost (1, 0) since the target of any of these transition is different from s err . Because we have an infinite number of these matches, when state s err is not reached, the valuation of these plays is lim n→∞ . Now, any play from s init following a strategy in Π contains the occurrence of at most i faults since the unique way of decreasing i is by performing a masking after a fault, and i ≤ j always. That is, for any π V ∈ Π V and π R ∈ Π we have that val(π V , π R ) =
Now, note that for those nodes s i / ∈ U i j for every i and j, the Verifier has strategies π V such that val(π V , π R ) = 0 for any Refuter's strategy π R . Then, for any Refuter's strategy π R / ∈ Π we have that inf πR∈ΠR val(π V , π R ) = 0. That is, for any Refuter's strategy we have inf
C.1 Byzantine Agreement
The Byzantine generals problem, introduced in [20] , is a classic problem of distributed agreement. We have a commanding general with n − 1 lieutenants. The communication between the commander and his lieutenants is performed through messengers. The commander may decide to attack an enemy city or to retreat; then, he sends the order to his lieutenants. Some of the lieutenants (or perhaps the commander) might be traitors. As a consequence, traitors might deliver false messages or perhaps they just avoid sending messages. The loyal lieutenants must agree on attacking or retreating after m + 1 rounds of communication, where m is the maximum numbers of traitors. As proved by Lamport, the algorithm can ensure correct operation only if fewer than one third of the generals are traitors. We assume the following: the messages are delivered correctly and all the lieutenants can communicate directly with each other; in this scenario they can recognize who is sending a message. Faults convert loyal lieutenants into traitors. Finally, traitors cannot forge messages on behalf of loyal lieutenants. Let us model this problem for four generals (one of them being the commander). Consider the following actions, send represents the commander sending his value to all lieutenants, fw denotes distributed forwarding of lieutenants' values, and agree represents a consensus between the lieutenants (this is achieved by voting), restart goes back to the initial state. Faults occur when some general becomes traitor. Figure 3 depicts the specification and the implementation for n = 4 and m = 1. For the sake of simplicity, the implementation only shows one possible sequence of betrayals for the lieutenants, but it is easy to see that the same behavior applies for other combinations. In the masking game, the s err state is reached when more than one betrayal has been committed, since there cannot be an agreement, and the forceful restart cannot be simulated by the normal system. The value of δ mask for this configuration is 1/3.
C.2 Bounded Retransmission Protocol
Consider the bounded retransmission protocol (BRP) [14] , this is a variant of the alternating bit protocol. The BRP protocol sends a file in a number of chunks, but allows only for a bounded number of retransmissions for each chunk. Let N denote the number of chunks and M the maximum number of retransmissions allowed for each chunk. A state in this system maintains the current number of chunks to be sent, say n with n ∈ {0, . . . , N }, and the number of retransmission attempts left, say r with r ∈ {0, . . . , M }. We consider the actions of sending and receiving messages, the send action decrements n and the receive action reestablishes r to M , respectively. Moreover, a restart action is considered for the case that all chunks of the current message have been correctly delivered. A fault occurs whenever a chunk sent was lost and a retransmission is consumed (i.e. r := r −1). An interesting property that one might associate with this model is that the value of r is never less than 0 (i.e it never falls short on retransmission attempts). To model this system we use labels send, receive and restart for denoting the aforementioned operations. Figure 4 illustrates normal and faulty versions for N = 2 and M = 2. In the corresponding masking game graph for these two systems, it can be seen that the s err state is reached when r < 0 and the implementation is forced to restart. This action cannot be simulated by the specification, which, at that point, can only receive messages. The value of δ mask for this configuration is equal to 1/4.
C.3 The Muller C-element
This is a simple delay-insensitive circuit [23] , it contains two boolean inputs and one boolean output. Its logical behavior is described as follows: if both inputs are true (resp. false) then the output of the C-element becomes true (resp. false).
If the inputs do not change, the output remains the same. In [2] , the following (informal) specification of the C-element with inputs x and y and output z is given: (i) Input x (resp. y) changes only if x ≡ z (resp., y ≡ z), (ii) Output z becomes true only if x ∧ y holds, and becomes false only if ¬x ∧ ¬y holds; (iii) Starting from a state where x∧y, eventually a state is reached where z is set to the same value that both x and y have. Ideally, both x and y change simultaneously. Faults may delay changing either x or y. Let us consider an implementation of the C-element with a majority voting circuit involving three inputs, where an extra input u in the circuit is added. Then, the predicate maj(x, y, u) returns the value of the majority circuit, which is assumed to work correctly. In addition to the traditional logical behavior of the C-element, u and z have to change at the same time, where the output z is fed back to the input u. Figure 5 shows two models of this circuit. A exhibits the nominal behavior of the C-element containing only normal transitions, whereas A ′ takes into account different faults, and provides a reaction to these. We assume that every state in these models is composed of boolean variables x, y, u, and z, where x, y, and u represent the inputs, and z represents the output. For instance, the state s 0 contains the information x = 0, y = 0, u = 0, and z = 0. Transitions are labeled by subsets of the set {cx, cy, cu, cz} of actions; action cx (resp., cy and cu) is the action that changes input x (resp., y and u); cz is the action of changing output z. When actions cx and cy are executed at the same time, we just write cxy. We only consider faults that delays the change of the inputs x or y (i.e., in this case, the inputs do not change simultaneously). The value of δ mask (A, A ′ ) is equal to 0, which means that this version of the Muller C-element with majority circuit is full masking fault-tolerance.
C.4 Summary of Results.
We have evaluated the application of the masking distance on the examples with different degrees of redundancy. For instance, we have evaluated the memory cell with redundancy of 3 bits and the masking distance is 1/3, for 5 bits its distance is 1/4, and so on. We have observed on each of these distances that they follow a common pattern w.r.t. the redundancy added. Thus, we have derived a general formula,
, with redundancy of k > 1. Similarly, we have measured the Byzantine Agreement and BRP with diverse redundancy size and derived a general formula for them. Particularly, for the Muller C-element circuit we did not derive any formula because it is a full masking example and its masking distance is always 0. Table 2 shows the general formula for each case study.
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